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Abstract
Messaging applications are changing the communication landscape in emerging
countries. While offering speed and affordability, these solutions have also opened
the way for the spread of misinformation. Aiming to better understand the dynamics
of COVID-19 as infodemic, we asked Brazilian participants (n=1007) to report the
perceived accuracy of 20 messages (10 true and 10 false). Each message was randomly
presented within five fictitious WhatsApp group chats of varying political orientation.
Correlational analyses revealed that right-wing participants had lower levels of truth
discernment as did those with greater trust in social media as a reliable source of
coronavirus information. Conversely, open-minded thinking about evidence and trust
in the WHO and traditional media was positively associated with truth discernment.
Familiarity with the content consistently increased perceived truthness for both true
and false messages. Results point to the nefarious effects of COVID-19 politicization
and underline the importance of promoting the ability to recognize and value new
evidence as well as enhancing trust in international agencies and traditional media.
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1 Introduction
With over 607 thousand casualties by COVID-19 as of November 2021, Brazil has suffered
the pandemic’s second-largest death toll (288 per 100 thousand). The country currently
ranks third in the world for the number of cases, which surpass 21.8 million (over 10,334
per 100 thousand) (Petterson et al., 2021). This massive public health crisis has come hand
in hand with the so-called “infodemic” or, as defined by the World Health Organization
(WHO), the “overabundance of information and the rapid spread of misleading or fabricated
news, images, and videos, [which], like the virus, is highly contagious, grows exponentially
(...), and complicates COVID-19 pandemic response efforts” (World Health Organization,
2020).
According to the Regional Center for Studies on the Development of the Information
Society (Centro Regional de Estudos para o Desenvolvimento da Sociedade da Informação,
2020 ), Brazil had an estimated 134 million self-reported internet users in 2019 (out of a total
population of 211 million). There has been considerable growth in internet accessibility in
recent years, with the percentage of users surging from 39% of the population over 10 years
of age in 2009 to 74% in 2019. While geographical disparities remain, it is the first time
in which over half of the rural population (53%) has access to the internet (versus 77% in
urban areas). The overall number of connected households has reached 71% in 2019 (over
50 million versus 46.5 million in 2018).
More widespread access to internet connection and smartphones has considerably
changed communications in the country, especially due to the increased reliance on mes-
saging applications. According to ICT Households 2019, these applications (notably,
WhatsApp, Skype, and Facebook Messenger) are the most common reason for going online
(92%), far surpassing social media (76%), e-mail (58%), and e-commerce (39%) (Valente,
2020). The cross-platform centralized messaging and voice-over-IP service WhatsApp is
particularly strong in Brazil, with over 120 million monthly active users (Haynes & Boadle,
2018). Owned by Meta Platforms, Inc. (formerly Facebook, Inc.), the application runs on
mobile devices but is also accessible from desktop computers. It enables users to send text
and voice messages, make voice and video calls, and share a variety of content, including
images, videos, etc. The application’s prevalence in Brazil can be explained by the high
cost of SMS, which was as much as 55 times more than in the United States in 2015 (Ac-
tivate, 2015). While requiring a mobile number, WhatsApp typically integrates popular
zero-rating plans that exempt particular apps from data consumption.
WhatsApp widespread adoption in Brazil has been accompanied by an expansion of
uses beyond simple text messaging. In the words of Saboia (2016, paragraph 2) “in Brazil
WhatsApp has become something much bigger than a chat app: a one-stop solution for
everyone, from small businesses to government agencies, to manage everything, from
transactions to relationships”. One such innovative function is community building. With
up to 256 participants, WhatsApp group chats can be accessed through invitation, link,
or QR code. These chats are increasingly common tools to gather people around shared
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interests or ideologies. The collaborative environment enables input from everyone and
facilitates the proliferation of messages at unprecedented speeds.
A recent survey of 75,000 people in 38 markets showed that respondents from Brazil
were highly likely to participate in large WhatsApp groups with people they do not know
— a trend that, according to the authors, “reflects how messaging applications can be used
to easily share information at scale, potentially encouraging the spread of misinformation”
(Newman et al., 2019, p. 10). The same study further points out that WhatsApp has become
a primary platform for discussing and sharing news not only in Brazil but also in Malaysia
and South Africa.
While enabling the various benefits of fast and easy communication, messaging ap-
plications also constitute hotspots for the spread of misinformation. With over 55 billion
messages sent by its users every day (WhatsApp, 2017), WhatsApp has been a central
channel for the proliferation of coronavirus-related fake news around the world (Delcker et
al., 2020; Romm, 2020). In Brazil, an analysis of nearly 60 thousand messages found in
publicly accessible, politically-oriented groups revealed that those containing misinforma-
tion were shared more frequently, by a larger number of users, and in a greater number of
groups than other textual messages (Resende et al., 2019). As demonstrated by Galhardi
et al. (2020), WhatsApp has played a central role in the dissemination of misinformation
about the COVID-19 pandemic, concentrating over 70% of coronavirus-related fake news
found by the authors.
Despite its crucial stake in the proliferation of misinformation in emerging countries,
WhatsApp remains largely unexplored by experimental research. Numerous questions re-
garding the influence of WhatsApp use on truth discernment remain unanswered, including
whether a higher identification with a group chat’s ideology leads to greater belief in mes-
sages that are posted within that group. The present study aims to fill in this gap by exploring
the effect of political orientation, group identification, and need for belonging on belief in
COVID-related misinformation. We were particularly curious about how identification with
WhatsApp groups affects truth discernment when considering the accuracy of information
that originates from said groups. Moreover, we wondered if need for belonging would play
a role in this effect. In other words, we questioned whether individuals with a greater need
for belonging are more likely to believe in messages that come from groups with which they
identify the most.
We work with Baumeister and Leary’s (1995, p. 497) belongingness hypothesis, ac-
cording to which “human beings have a pervasive drive to form and maintain (...) lasting,
positive, and significant interpersonal relationships”. In light of recent studies on the influ-
ence of political orientation on the belief in fake news (e.g., Van Bavel & Pereira, 2018), we
argue that the need for belonging and identity-protection goals impact cognitive processes
and undermine one’s ability to discern misinformation. It does so by triggering motivated
reasoning, or “the tendency of people to conform assessments of information to some goal
or end extrinsic to accuracy” (Kahan, 2013, p. 408). We argue that WhatsApp groups are a
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privileged environment for building and sharing identity goals, especially for people with
a high need for belonging. Therefore, they constitute a prime context for the study of how
misinformation propagates and should no longer be neglected.
We decided to work with politically-oriented WhatsApp messages in particular due
to the politicization of the pandemic in Brazil. Overall, the lack of consensus on how
to respond to the pandemic has intensified ideological divides, accelerating polarization
between supporters of the current right-wing President, Jair Bolsonaro, and his opponents.
A former army captain, Bolsonaro served for almost three decades as a conservative member
of the Federal Chamber of Deputies (the equivalent to the U.S. House of Representatives).
His rise to the presidency, in 2018, was a major political shift in the country, where the
left-wing Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT, in Portuguese) had won the
previous four presidential elections. The 2018 race was marked by controversy regarding
the ineligibility of former President and most prominent name in the left-wing Workers’
Party Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (known as Lula), who had been jailed for corruption and
money laundering — his conviction was annulled by the Supreme Court in 2021.
It is worth noting that, since the end of the military dictatorship (1964–1985), Brazil
has consolidated a multiparty presidential system. The diversity of political organizations
and ever-changing coalitions have made it traditionally difficult to understand Brazilian
politics within the dichotomous view of left versus right, or liberals versus conservatives.
However, the rise of Bolsonaro has been accompanied by growing polarization and increas-
ing resonance with the political debates found in the United States (Layton et al., 2021).
Throughout the coronavirus pandemic, the right-wing in Brazil has been closely associ-
ated with neoliberalism, anti-corruption and anti-communism discourse, pro-gun rights,
support of pentecostal churches, and, within extreme circles, scientific denialism. On the
other hand, the left-wing has been associated with diverse social movements, such as social
justice, feminism, LGBT+ rights, land reform, workers’ rights, and more.
Over a year into his mandate, Bolsonaro joined various other world leaders who have
garnered attention for their unorthodox responses to COVID-19. In the early days of the
pandemic, the President largely dismissed the virus’ impact, publicly comparing it to a
“measly cold”. As the crisis evolved, he advocated the use of hydroxychloroquine (Ricard
& Medeiros, 2020), among other demonstrations of scientific denialism and reliance on false
information. Given the growing body of evidence pointing towards the ability of political
leaders and personalities to promote belief in conspiracy theories and misinformation among
like-minded individuals (Swire et al., 2017; Uscinski et al., 2020), we expected right-leaning
participants to be particularly susceptible to coronavirus-related falsehoods. However,
as previously stated, we predicted that this effect would be moderated not only by the
identification with the WhatsApp group in which the information would be presented but
also by the individual’s need for belonging.
In addition to tapping into the still uncharted dynamics of WhatsApp group messaging
and its interplay with political identity, we aimed to contribute to some of the ongoing
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debates within the misinformation literature by studying the replicability of certain findings
in the Brazilian context. For instance, we wondered if the illusory truth effect would lead to
greater perceived accuracy of familiar messages versus unknown ones. Experimental studies
that manipulate familiarity have shown that repetition increases belief (e.g., Pennycook et
al., 2018; De keersmaecker et al., 2020; Hassan & Barber, 2021). However, it remains
unclear whether this effect would hold true in observational investigations, given the lack
of control over the context of previous exposure to information (which could include, for
instance, fact-checking sources).
We were particularly curious as to whether analytical and open-minded thinking would
predict greater truth discernment, as found by Pennycook and Rand (2018) and Bronstein et
al. (2018). Designed to cue intuitive but incorrect responses, the Cognitive Reflection Test
(CRT; Frederick, 2005) aims to measure an individual’s disposition to engage in reflective,
analytical thinking. Research has linked higher CRT scores with decreased reliance on
biases and heuristics (Toplak et al., 2011), greater skepticism about religious, paranormal,
and conspiratorial concepts (Pennycook et al., 2015), and enhanced ability to discern true
and fake news (Pennycook & Rand, 2018).
Complementary, the Actively Open-Minded Thinking about Evidence Scale (AOT-E;
Pennycook et al., 2020a) aims to assess whether people are open to change their beliefs
according to evidence. As proposed by Baron (1985, 1993), actively open-minded thinking
(AOT) favors the recognition of false claims, as it encourages the consideration of evidence
and opinions that are contrary to one’s initial conclusion or preferred belief. Research has
shown negative correlations between AOT and paranormal beliefs (Svedholm & Lindeman,
2013), belief in conspiracy theories (Swami et al., 2014), and superstitious beliefs (Svedholm
& Lindeman, 2017, using the Fact Resistance sub-scale of the original scale). Given our
focus on the infodemic, AOT’s function as a standard of evaluation for the trustworthiness
of various sources of information is particularly relevant (Baron, 2019).
Though expecting a positive impact of both analytical and open-minded thinking on
truth discernment, we also questioned how this effect would interact with each message’s
(in)consistency with the participants’ political identity. Given the politicization and po-
larization of the pandemic in Brazil, we expected that right-leaning participants would be
more likely to believe in falsehoods due to their consistency with the discourse adopted by
the country’s conservative leadership.
Keeping in mind the context of WhatsApp groups, we were curious about the interplay
between two potential phenomena: on the one hand, a decreased discernment among right-
leaning participants; on the other hand, an increased belief in information that is posted in
groups with which there is greater identification, particularly in individuals with a higher
need for belonging.
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2 Method
Sample size determination, data manipulation, exclusions, and all measures in the study
are reported below. All data and materials are available at the Open Science Framework
[https://osf.io/cjs2m/].
2.1 Participants
This study was run between June 15 and July 7, 2020. We recruited voluntary participants
using paid advertising on Facebook, a useful tool for countries in which services such
as MTurk or Lucid are not widely available (Samuels & Zucco, 2013). In total, 1007
participants from all regions of Brazil completed the study, 148 participants were excluded
due to their failure to complete the attention check item. Our final sample consisted of
859 participants, 52.74% female, 46.10% male, and 1.16% other; with a mean age of 44
years (SD=14; age range=18-78); 22.70% had completed or were pursuing graduate studies,
45.05% had completed or were pursuing undergraduate studies, and 32.25% had completed
high school or below; 21.89% of which identified politically as left or extremely left, 60.30%
as center and 17.81% as right or extremely right. Our sample size determination followed
the same criteria as Pennycook et al. (2020b), namely, (a) it is a satisfactory sample size for
this experimental design, (b) it was within our financial means given our recruiting method,
and (c) it is comparable to what has been used in past research.
2.2 Materials and Measures
In a within-subject design, participants reported the perceived accuracy of 20 messages
with COVID-19 related information (10 true and 10 false) presented in WhatsApp message
format (see Figure 1). After seeing each message, participants reported their perceived
accuracy by answering the question “How true is the above message?”. To do so, they used
a slider scale ranging from 0 (completely false) to 100 (completely true). The content of
each message was found online, either in fact-checking websites or trustworthy sources,
such as the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
True information pertained to the following topics: masks; the second wave of infections;
coronavirus lifespan on different surfaces; immunity after contamination; coronavirus in
dogs; asymptomatic transmission; hydroxychloroquine; loss of smell and taste; COVID-19
in children; and hydration. False information encompassed the following topics: virus
vs. bacteria; boldo tea; contaminated masks from China; coronavirus as man-made; social
isolation; coronavirus pH levels; chloroquine; false COVID-19 reports; Brazilian military;
and 5G networks. All the experimental stimuli and their translation to English may be found
in our supplemental material [https://osf.io/cjs2m/].
In addition to the perceived accuracy of each message, participants reported their
familiarity with the content by answering the question “Did you have previous knowledge
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of this message’s content?” (we purposefully asked about the content and not the message
itself because information is often shared through WhatsApp and social media with varying
formats but similar content). Possible answers included “yes” (coded as 1), “no”, and “not
sure” (both coded as 0).
Figure 1: Examples of experimental stimuli - true (left) and false (right) WhatsApp mes-
sages.
We created visual stimuli (screenshots) that mimicked the format of WhatsApp’s mobile
application. Each image contained the title and image of the group chat on top, the message
area with WhatsApp’s default wallpaper in the center, and the text, image, and voice input
bar at the bottom. The messages were randomly assigned to be presented within the visual
context of one of five fictitious WhatsApp group chats. By the end of the task, each
participant had seen 2 true messages and 2 false messages in each group.
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Each group’s name and image indicated its political orientation (or lack thereof). For
the titles, we selected political slogans and popular sayings that expressed either discontent
with the Workers’ Party and support for Bolsonaro (right-wing groups) or discontent with
Bolsonaro and support for Lula (left-wing groups). The detailed descriptions of the groups
were:
- One neutral group: “Amigos” (in English, “Friends”);
- Two right-wing groups: “Família Bolsonaro” and “PT Nunca Mais” (in En-
glish, “Bolsonaro Family” and “Workers’ Party Never Again”);
- Two left-wing groups: “Lula Livre” and “Não é meu presidente” (in English,
“Free Lula” and “Not my President”).
Participants indicated their willingness to participate in each WhatsApp group (yes or
no) and reported their identification with each chat (answering the question “how much do
you identify with each of the following groups?”) on a slider scale from 0 (no identification)
to 100 (complete identification). Given the political nature of the titles and images for each
group, we assume that identification means support of the particular orientation and ideology
that is portrayed.
Prior to the experimental task, participants reported the frequency with which they
consumed COVID-19 news (multiple-choice alternatives ranged from less than once a
week to multiple times a day). They also specified which sources of information they used
(the list included governmental websites, international organizations’ websites, TV, radio,
YouTube, digital and print news outlets, social media, messaging applications, and “other”).
Participants were also asked, “How much do you trust the following sources as providers of
useful and accurate information about COVID-19?”. Participants’ answers varied from 0
(not at all) to 100 (completely) on a slider scale and pertained to 1) governmental authorities;
2) newspaper, magazines, TV, and radio (from now on referred to as “traditional media”);
3) doctors and other medical professionals; 4) social media (Facebook, WhatsApp groups,
etc.); 5) WHO; 6) family and friends.
Participants reported their daily WhatsApp use (answers ranged from “don’t use it every
day” to “more than 2 hours a day”) and participation in group chats related to 1) family and
friends; 2) politics; 3) work and study; 4) news; and 5) personal interests (sports, religion,
etc.) (they were instructed to select all that applied).
Participants also answered three questions regarding their political views. Firstly, they
indicated their position on the political spectrum (scale of 1, extremely to the left, to 7,
extremely to the right). Secondly, they answered who they voted for in the 2018 runoff
election (options included the current President, Bolsonaro; left-wing candidate, Haddad;
blank or null; and rather not say). Finally, participants reported their level of satisfaction
with the current administration using a scale of 1 (extremely dissatisfied) to 5 (extremely
satisfied). Participants also reported their age, education level, gender, and state of residence.
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They further completed a version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-2), the Actively
Open-Minded Thinking about Evidence Scale (AOT-E), and the Need to Belong Scale
(NTBS), as described below.
CRT-2. Participants answered a 4-item variation of the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT-
2; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). Similar to the original test, the CRT-2 is designed to
prompt intuitive but incorrect responses; however, it is not as prone to numeracy confounds
and is not as widely known by respondents in Brazil. It includes questions such as “If you
are running a race and you pass the person in second place, what place are you in?”. The
test had low reliability (U = .48) which is expected from the original study (U = .51).
Actively Open-Minded Thinking About Evidence Scale (AOT-E). As a variation of
the Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale (Stanovich & West, 2007), the AOT-E contains
8 items (e.g., “A person should always consider new possibilities”) and measures whether
people are open to change their beliefs according to evidence (Pennycook et al., 2020a).
This scale showed strong reliability in the original study (U = .87), in which responses
ranged from 1 (strongly disagree) to 6 (strongly agree). For the present study, we translated
the items to Brazilian Portuguese and used a 5-point scale, which enabled participants to
take a neutral standing (3 or neither agree nor disagree). Our version also showed good
reliability (U = .72).
Need to Belong Scale (NTBS). Developed by Leary et al. (2013), this scale was
designed to measure the dispositional dimension of the need to belong, such as seeking
social connections and valuing acceptance by others. We used a translation to Brazilian
Portuguese that was adapted and validated by Gastal and Pilati (2016). It contained the 10
original items and had strong reliability (original study: U = .78; present study: U = .77).
Participants could answer with a scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly
agree).
We included a screener question as a part of the AOT-E block of questions. The item
instructed participants to select “Totally Disagree” to indicate that they were effectively
paying attention to the survey. We included the dichotomous variable “attention” (coded as
1 for “passed”, 0 for “failed”).
2.3 Procedures
Participants answered an online survey developed in Qualtrics [https://www.qualtrics.com/].
The study had eight components, presented in the following order: 1) research presentation
and consent; 2) CRT-2; 3) sources of information usage and trust; 4) WhatsApp usage
and willingness to participate in group chats; 5) experimental task; 6) NTBS; 7) AOT-E;
8) political orientation, satisfaction with the current President and 2018 candidate; and 9)
socio-demographic questions. Within each component, the order of items was randomized.
As previously described, the experimental portion of the study had a within-subject,
repeated measures design. Participants used 0–100 slider scales to report the perceived
accuracy of 20 messages (10 true and 10 false) that were randomly presented within
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the visual context of five WhatsApp group chats (in the format of screenshots). Our
manipulation thus included the accuracy of messages (true vs. false) and the context in
which they were presented (five group chats of varying political orientation). Participants’
responses to the visual stimuli served as the basis for the calculation of our dependent
variables.
We followed the steps of Pennycook and Rand (2018) and Pennycook et al. (2020b)
to compute discernment. This variable represents the difference between the total score
of perceived accuracy of true messages and the total score of perceived accuracy of false
messages. It was transformed to range from –1 to 1, with higher discernment scores
indicating an overall judgment of true and false messages as they were. This variable
presented adequate reliability (U = .79).
We further created two more specific discernment variables, based on the (in)consistency
with the WhatsApp groups in which the messages were presented. Given the previously
discussed politicization of the pandemic, we considered false information to be consistent
with right-wing WhatsApp groups and inconsistent with left-wing ones. We also considered
true information to be inconsistent with right-wing WhatsApp groups and consistent with
left-wing ones. Information presented within the neutral group, Amigos (i.e., Friends), were
not considered. These variables were also transformed to range from –1 to 1, with higher
discernment scores indicating an overall judgment of true and false messages as they were.
Our last dependent variable was perceived accuracy (by true and false content), which
is the mean of each participant’s responses (in the 0 to 100 perceived accuracy scale)
transformed to range between 0 and 1.
As for our independent variables, we implemented additional transformations to allow
easier interpretation of results and usage of data. Political scales (orientation and satisfaction
with the current President) were centered around 0, allowing them to range from –1 to 1
(–1 represents “extremely dissatisfied” and “extremely to the left” while 1 means “extremely
satisfied” or “extremely to the right”).
Finally, we created three variables for familiarity: a general one, one for true content,
and another for false content. Considering that all participants were exposed to the same
messages, we counted how many times they reported having previous knowledge of the
information. For the true and false scores, the total number of (true or false) familiar
messages was divided by 10. For the general score, the sum of familiar messages (both true
and false) was divided by 20. Therefore, all familiarity variables ranged from 0 to 1.
Our analyses were conducted in R, version 4.0.5, and consisted of robust paired t-tests
and correlations. Assumption tests were conducted for each procedure and can be found in
our supplemental material.
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3 Results
We began by investigating variables that were central to our goal of understanding the
dynamics of misinformation in WhatsApp groups (i.e., daily WhatsApp use, participation
in group chats, willingness to participate in, and identification with the fictitious WhatsApp
group chats).
Participants reported remarkably high use of WhatsApp on a daily basis, reflecting the
nationwide trend discussed in the introduction. 97.2% used the application at least 15
minutes a day and 36.1% did so more than 2 hours a day. Participation in group chats was
also high, reaching 89% of our sample. While 80% reported being part of groups related
to family and friends, only 10% participated in chats related to politics.
Figure 2 shows that most participants said that they would not participate in the
politically-oriented groups, a trend that persisted regardless of the ideological orientation.
Conversely, the majority (60.4%) reported that they would participate in the neutral group,
“Friends”. Figure 3 presents the mean levels of reported identification with each group
and standard deviations. It is worth noting that reported identification was consistently low
and that standard errors include zero for the political groups, except for the neutral group
(mean=54, SD=39.86). Unfortunately, these results lead to the conclusion that participation
































Figure 2: Willingness to participate in WhatsApp groups.
Despite participants’ lack of identification with our fictitious WhatsApp groups, we
considered that their political stance could still have influenced discernment levels. Specif-
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Figure 3: Identification with WhatsApp groups (mean; SD).
ically, we wondered whether the consistency of each group’s political orientation with the
real-life discourse around the country would affect discernment (as previously mentioned,
we determined that true information was consistent with left-wing groups and inconsistent
with right-wing groups, and vice versa). Our analyses revealed no difference between these
groups. Mean discernment (.20) was the same for messages presented in both consistent
(SD=.13) and inconsistent groups (SD=.12). The paired t-test also showed that there was
no difference (t(516)=.096, p=.92, d=.002).
We proceeded to explore the perceived accuracy of true and false messages. Our analyses
revealed that true information was perceived as more accurate (mean=.69, SD=.18) than
false content (mean=.20, SD=.20). This difference (.55, 95% CI [.53, .57]) was relevant
considering the paired t-test (t(516)=51.96, p<.001, d=.94). Given the large variability in
this measure, the t-test conducted was robust and winsorized (Mair & Wilcox, 2020). Also,
taking into account that this variable ranged from 0 to 1, it could be said that false content
was perceived as more inaccurate than true content was perceived as accurate (since .20 is
closer to 0 than .69 is closer to 1.00).
Further exploration of our dependent variables revealed an absence of normal distribu-
tion, which led us to explore correlations through Kendall’s g coefficient. Specifically, we
investigated correlations between discernment and various measurements, including demo-
graphic and political characteristics, individual differences in analytical and open-minded
thinking, need for belonging, as well as information-seeking behavior, confidence in differ-
ent sources of COVID-19 information, WhatsApp use, and familiarity with true and false
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information. As reported in Table 1, CRT-2 scores (although with a small coefficient),
AOT-E scores, confidence in the WHO and healthcare professionals, confidence and use of
traditional media, education, and frequency of information had positive correlation coef-
ficients. Familiarity with false messages, confidence in government authorities and social
media, use of messaging applications, political orientation, satisfaction with the current
President, and age were negatively correlated with discernment (though some with small
coefficients).
Table 1 also presents detailed correlations involving the perceived accuracy of true and
false messages. Familiarity with false and true messages were positively correlated with
accuracy scores for false and true content, respectively. Political orientation and satisfaction
with the current President were positively correlated with the perceived accuracy of false
messages while negatively associated with that of true information. It is worth noting that
the coefficient for the correlation between AOT-E scores and the perceived accuracy of false
messages is three times the one for true information (though working in opposite directions).
Similarly, CRT-2 scores are solely, and negatively, correlated with the perceived accuracy
of false messages.
The correlations presented on Table 2 further allow us to identify potential patterns
in information consumption, especially those between political orientation and satisfaction
with the current President and confidence in different sources of COVID-19 information.
Both right-wing orientation and greater satisfaction were negatively correlated with trust
in the WHO, doctors and medical professionals, and traditional media as reliable sources
of COVID-19 information (they were also negatively correlated with the use of traditional
media, particularly TV, newspapers, and radio). Conversely, both political orientation
and satisfaction with the current President were positively correlated with confidence in
governmental authorities, and satisfaction with the current President had a very small but
positive correlation with trust in social media as a reliable source of information.
4 Discussion
This study aimed to tap into the numerous questions regarding the ongoing COVID-19
infodemic, particularly the spread of misinformation through messaging applications and
its potential interplay with group identity and need for belonging. As did Galhardi et al.
(2020)’s, our results shed light on the role of WhatsApp, along with social media platforms,
in intensifying this phenomenon in Brazil. We found small but negative correlations between
confidence in social media as a reliable provider of COVID-19 information and the use of
messaging applications as sources of such information and the ability to discern true and
false content. This result is in accordance with recent international literature, including a
study of 2,254 UK residents that showed that people who believe in COVID-19 conspiracy
theories, such as symptoms being linked to 5G radiation, are more likely to be getting their
information about COVID-19 from social media (Duffy & Allington, 2020).
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Table 1: Correlations (Kendall’s g) for main study variables.
Perceived Accuracy
Discernment True messages Fake messages
Familiarity with
True Messages .04 .19 .11
False Messages −.16 .00 .25
CRT-2 .09 −.01 −.13
AOT-E .29 .11 −.33
Confidence in0
Governmental Authorities −.08 −.03 .11
World Health Organization .32 .15 −.33
Health Professionals .12 .09 −.09
Family and Friends −.05 .01 .09
Social Media −.07 .01 .14
Traditional Media .29 .16 −.26
Use of1
Newspapers .26 .13 −.25
Messaging Apps −.10 −.02 .13
TV .16 .09 −.14
Radio and Podcasts .08 .03 −.08
Social Media −.05 .04 .11
National and international health
authorities’ websites
.10 .05 −.10
Political Orientation2 −.31 −.11 .36
Satisfaction with the President3 −.38 −.15 .42
Education .15 .03 −.20
Age −.08 .05 .16
Frequency of information consumption .13 .20 .01
Time of WhatsApp use −.01 −.02 .00
Note. 0 as reliable sources of COVID-19 information. 1 as a source of COVID-19
information. 2 –1=extremely to the left; 7=extremely to the right. 3 –1=extremely
dissatisfied; 5=extremely satisfied. Correlations above .09 (absolute value) are p<.01;
those above .06 are p<.05.
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Table 2: Correlations (Kendall’s g) for secondary study variables
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 CRT-2 . . . . . . . . . . .
2 AOT-E .14 . . . . . . . . . .
3 Conf WHO .02 .17 . . . . . . . . .
4 Conf Profs .01 .02 .29 . . . . . . . .
5 Conf Media .01 .15 .40 .22 . . . . . . .
6 Conf Govt .02 −.09 .03 .07 .09 . . . . . .
7 Conf SocMed −.03 −.11 −.04 .04 .10 .16 . . . . .
8 Use News .07 .16 .18 .06 .30 −.03 .00 . . . .
9 Use TV −.01 −.03 .23 .09 .32 −.04 .08 .29 . . .
10 Use Radio .01 .04 .05 −.01 .11 .00 .17 .16 .11 . .
11 LR Politics −.06 −.23 −.34 −.09 −.27 .16 .05 −.21 −.18 −.11 .
12 Pres Satisfac −.04 −.24 −.40 −.12 −.30 .18 .07 −.23 −.21 −.13 .50
Note. 1. CRT-2. 2. AOT-E. Confidence in 3. WHO. 4. Health Professionals. 5. Traditional
Media. 6. Governmental Authorities. 7. Social Media as reliable sources of COVID-19
information. Use of 8. Newspapers. 9. TV. 10. Radio and Podcasts as a source of
COVID-19 information. 11. Political Orientation (1=extremely to the left; 7=extremely
to the right). 12. Satisfaction with the President (1=extremely dissatisfied; 5=extremely
satisfied). Correlations above .09 (absolute value) are p<.01; those above .06 are p<.05.
It is worth noting that the time spent daily on WhatsApp had no influence on the
participants’ performance, which indicates that the main issue is not the general use of
the application but its role as a source of information and the confidence that some people
place on group chats as providers of “uncensored” and “unbiased” news. The rise of
WhatsApp as an alternative to “official” fake news has been documented in other countries,
such as Spain (Elías & Catalan-Matamoros, 2020) and India (Reis et al., 2020). Such
evidence should inspire innovative strategies that leverage social media and messaging
applications to target misinformation and promote the spread of reliable content. Through
a randomized experiment in Zimbabwe, Bowles et al. (2020) verified that the dissemination
of accurate information through WhatsApp increased knowledge about COVID-19 and
reduced potentially harmful behavior.
While confidence in social media had a negative correlation, reliance on newspapers, TV,
and radio had a positive association with discernment. Despite the undeniable shortcomings
of many agents within the “traditional media” category, which is by no means immune to
biased discourse, long-standing mechanisms of fact-checking and research seem to have
favored the distribution of evidence-based information, in line with the WHO. Various agents
within the professional media recognize that the pandemic has created an opportunity to
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“prove the value of trustworthy news” (Carson et al., 2020, paragraph 2).
These results resonate with van Dĳck and Alinejad (2020, paragraph 1), who point out
that the linear model of science communication “has gradually converted into a networked
model where social media propel information flows circulating between all actors involved”.
In this context of transformation, our results underline the urgency of a multifaceted ap-
proach. Targeted measures that educate users about the dynamics of (mis)information
within messaging applications and social media should be combined with efforts to rebuild
confidence in professional media. The former could be achieved through new technologi-
cal solutions that expand fact-checking capabilities, particularly those that preserve users’
privacy through end-to-end encryption, as proposed by Reis et al. (2020). The latter could
benefit from stronger policies and standards along with greater transparency about how
information is gathered, evaluated, and presented to the public (The Trust Project, 2021).
As for our contribution to existing debates within the misinformation literature, specif-
ically the illusory truth effect, our results corroborate previous findings according to which
repetition increases the perceived truthfulness of information. Despite methodological dif-
ferences (i.e. our study did not manipulate familiarity), familiarity with true and false was
positively correlated with accuracy scores for true and false information, respectively.
These results underscore the importance of recent studies that shed light on strategies to
counter the harmful effect of prior exposure to falsehoods. In a series of four experiments,
Brashier et al. (2020) verified that an initial accuracy focus (i.e. priming of a fact-checking
behavior) prevented the illusion effect when participants held relevant knowledge. Similarly,
Jackson (2019) saw a reduction in the illusory truth effect when corrections were presented
multiple times. Given the great difficulties of stopping the spread of misinformation,
especially in encrypted messaging applications, it is good to know that awareness campaigns
could have positive effects on discernment.
Unfortunately, our research was limited in its ability to identify the context in which
participants had previously encountered each message. It is likely that at least part of the
false information presented in our experiment had been previously seen in fact-checking
websites. Further research is necessary to elucidate the dynamics between the illusory truth
effect and fact-checking initiatives.
In line with our original expectation, our results demonstrated that both analytical and
open-minded thinking were positively associated with truth discernment. Both AOT-E and
CRT-2 scores were positively correlated with discernment, in accordance with Pennycook
and Rand (2018) and Bronstein et al. (2018), however, the coefficient for CRT-2 scores
was extremely small. These results underscore the importance of AOT as a standard to
judge the trustworthiness of information amidst the infodemic. Baron (2019) reminds us
that trustworthy sources present signs of AOT, including the nature of evidence and its
limitations. Participants with greater AOT-E scores seemed to have a greater propensity to
identify these signs and calibrate trust levels accordingly.
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In fact, they were particularly good at identifying false messages. Correlations between
CRT-2 and AOT-E scores and the perceived accuracy of true and false information show that
the misclassification of false messages is largely responsible for low discernment among
those with lower levels of analytical and open-minded thinking. These results underline the
importance of developing effective strategies to debunk fake news, especially in the context
of messaging applications.
As for the limitations of our study, it is important to point out that we were unable to
test our primary prediction, that individuals with a greater need for belonging would have
less discernment of information presented in the context of WhatsApp groups with which
they identified the most. The participants’ lack of identification with and unwillingness
to participate in our fictitious group chats made it impossible to elucidate our research
question. Among other plausible explanations, this could have been due to the group’s
names, which may have been perceived as too extreme and/or polarized or not sufficiently
related to recent political hot-topics.
The specificities of the Brazilian context may also be related to our inability to inves-
tigate the absence of effect from group identification and need for belonging. Our choice
to randomly present information within different WhatsApp groups diverged significantly
from what is actually found in real chats (for instance, it is highly unlikely that real left-
wing groups would distribute messages about coronavirus as a Chinese communist threat).
However, the absence of difference in mean discernment of information that was consistent
versus inconsistent with the groups’ political orientation seems to suggest that our manipu-
lation was simply ineffective. In any case, future research should investigate the impact of
identification with WhatsApp groups on the perceived accuracy of information regarding
less politicized topics.
Other relevant limitations of our study pertain to our sample composition and the nature
of our conclusions. Even though we were able to get participants from all geographic
regions of Brazil, our Facebook recruitment efforts did not yield the desired representa-
tiveness in socio-demographic terms, nor did it reach a sufficient number of individuals
who used Whatsapp as their main source of information. Future efforts should consider the
implementation of alternative recruitment methods. Moreover, even though our analyses
unveil some interesting associations, their correlational nature leads to limited conclusions.
It is imperative to devise more effective experimental designs that will allow for a better
understanding of the dynamics of misinformation on messaging applications.
Despite these shortcomings, our results still shed light on the importance of political
orientation in the COVID-19 infodemic. As previously stated, political leaders can play an
important role in influencing the perception of information among their partisans (Swire et
al., 2017; Uscinski et al., 2020). In the context of the pandemic, various world leaders (both
left- and right-wing) have adopted positions of incredulity, denial of scientific evidence,
and promotion of unproven methods of prevention and cure. Given the specifics of Brazil’s
political scenario, particularly the President’s discourse, the impact of the politicization of
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the pandemic is evident in the fact that right-leaning participants (and especially those with
greater levels of satisfaction with the current President) consistently showed lower levels
of discernment. These results echo the findings of Calvillo et al. (2020), according to
which conservatism predicted less accurate discernment between real and fake COVID-19
headlines in the U.S. context.
The interplay of politicization and infodemic is particularly worrisome as it undermines
confidence in science, a trend that can have lasting effects that go far beyond COVID-19.
As pointed out by Barry et al. (2020), distrust in science creates fertile ground for misin-
formation. Our results underline the importance of a two-pronged approach: promoting
knowledge of what constitutes scientific evidence and cultivating the ability to continuously
reevaluate beliefs according to new evidence. Future research should focus on developing
strategies to effectively achieve both goals.
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